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ABSTRACT
We study the role of housing wealth in financing retirement consumption. In our model
retirees: (i) derive utility benefits from remaining in their home (aging in place); and (ii)
choose in each period whether to maintain their house. The evidence that we present shows
that these features are important in explaining the saving decisions of the elderly. The costs
and the maintenance requirement of reverse mortgages reduce (or eliminate) the benefits of
the loans for retirees who wish to do less maintenance. We evaluate the impact of different
loan features on retirees’ utility, cash-flows to lenders and to the government agency that
provides mortgage insurance. We show that combining reverse mortgages with insurance
against a forced home sale (e.g. due to a move to a nursing home) is Pareto improving and
can lead to increased demand for the loans due to product complementarities.
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1 Introduction
In many countries, the government provides a pension to retirees through the social secu-
rity system. However, there have been increasing concerns about the sustainability of these
(mainly unfunded) social security systems and the adequacy of households’ private retirement
savings (Banks, Blundell, Tanner, 1998, Kotlikoff, 2001, Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun,
2006). At the same time, homeownership rates are particularly high among U.S. households
and for most of them housing assets constitute the single most important component of their
wealth (Bertaut and Starr-McCluer, 2002). We study the role of housing wealth in financing
retirement consumption.
Retirees could release their home equity by downsizing, by moving into rental accommo-
dation, or by using financial products such as reverse mortgages (RMs). However, in spite
of its potentially large relevance, the existing empirical studies do not find strong support
for housing wealth being used to finance non-housing retirement consumption. Retirees do
not appear to purchase a house of lower value or to discontinue homeownership. The few
that discontinue homeownership do so only late in life (after age 75 or so, as documented by
Venti and Wise, 2004, Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 2011a). To date, the demand for RMs has
been limited (Caplin, 2002, Davidoff, 2015, Shan, 2011).
The explanations that have been proposed in the literature for why older individuals do
not wish to dissave could in principle also explain why they do not wish to tap into their
home equity. Those which have received more attention are bequest motives (important early
references include Abel, 1985, Hurd, 1989 and Bernheim, 1991) and precautionary saving
motives arising from uncertain life span and risky medical expenditures (Hubbard, Skinner,
and Zeldes, 1994, Palumbo, 1999, De Nardi, French, and Jones, 2010, Ameriks, Caplin,
Laufer, Van Nieuwerburgh, 2011). If retirees do not wish to dissave, they may not want to
sell their house or borrow against it. It may also be re-assuring for retirees to know that if
they remain homeowners they have a hedge against future house price fluctuations (Sinai
and Souleles, 2005).
In order to investigate these explanations we build a model of the consumption and hous-
ing choices of retired homeowners. Retirees derive utility from housing, from non-durable
consumption and from leaving a bequest. They are subject to several sources of risk, includ-
ing an uncertain life span, health risk, medical expenditure shocks, interest rate risk and
house price fluctuations. Our model has two additional features. The first is that retirees
derive utility benefits from living in the same house that they retired in, which increase with
the number of years in the residence. Such benefits are at the center of the concepts of “place
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attachment” and of “aging in place.” Place attachment is a key concept in environmental
psychology.1 It refers to a set of feelings that emotionally bind a person to a given place.
Rubinstein and Parmelee (1992) argue that the concept is especially significant for older
people, as one way of keeping the past alive, maintaining a sense of continuity and fostering
identity. Venti and Wise (2004) discuss the importance of these psychological benefits when
analyzing the housing decisions of the elderly.
The second model feature is that in each period, retirees choose whether to maintain
their property. The possibility of cutting back on housing maintenance may be particularly
important for older homeowners, as a way of dissaving and of having more cash available to
meet medical and other expenditures. Davidoff (2005) uses the American Housing Survey
(AHS) to provide evidence that older homeowners reduce housing maintenance and that this
reduction has an impact on the sale price of the houses when they are eventually transacted.
The model calibration shows that both the benefits of aging in place and maintenance
choice are important model features for explaining the homeownership age profiles, mainte-
nance expenses and wealth decumulation of the elderly. Bequest and precautionary savings
motives are also important, and they lead individuals to remain homeowners until a later
age. However, without the aging in place benefits, the model predicted decline in home-
ownership rates with age is too large compared with the data. The fundamental economic
reason is simple: Even though precautionary savings and bequest motives lead retirees to
save more, housing is not an asset that is particularly suitable for this purpose, since it is
lumpy and risky. As retirees age, as they are hit by health and medical expenditure shocks,
and as house prices and interest rates fluctuate, in the absence of aging in place benefits,
the likelihood that at all points in time the value of each retiree’s house matches the amount
that he/she wishes to consume of housing and to save is fairly small, so too many decide to
sell. Both the utility from aging in place and maintenance choice features of our model have
implications for RMs.
RMs allow retired homeowners to borrow against their home equity without moving
and to make partial withdrawals which may help them choose a savings level that better
matches their desired level. Borrowers do not have to make any payments on the loan before
1When applying the concept of place attachment to the elderly, a common concept used in policy circles
is that of “aging in place.” The Centers for Disease Control defines this as the “the ability to live in ones
own home and community safely, independently, and comfortably, regardless of age, income, or ability level.”
Survey data shows that the majority of older individuals do want to remain in their current residence. When
asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement “What I would like to do is stay in my
current residence as long as possible,” an overwhelming majority of 91% (95%) of individuals in the 65-74
(75 and older) age group answered that they strongly agreed or somewhat agreed (Kochera, Straight, and
Guterbock (2005)).
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termination: any interest due is simply rolled into the outstanding loan balance. When the
retiree dies or sells the house, the loan is terminated and it becomes due. If at termination
the outstanding loan amount is higher than the value of the house, neither the retiree nor
the heirs are responsible for any shortfall. Therefore, from the point of view of retirees, RMs
combine the right to borrow against their house with a put option, or the right at loan
termination to give the house to the lender instead of repaying the outstanding loan amount
(Davidoff, 2015). In the U.S. most loans are insured by the government, through the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA), which bears the losses if house values decline.
Figure 1 plots the number of RM loans endorsed by the FHA and the S&P/Case-Shiller
10-City Composite Price Index over the last two decades. The number of new RMs increased
considerably over this period, to a monthly maximum of 12,000 just before the onset of the
recent financial crisis. In spite of the large increase, the number of loans is relatively small
when compared to the number of potential borrowers (only two to three percent of eligible
borrowers take out a RM).2
Figure 1: Number of reverse mortgage loans
Our calibrated model generates limited demand for RMs. Even though they could be
2The figure also plots the percentage of loans that are of lump-sum type. We discuss the types of products
in the next section.
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beneficial for retirees who derive utility benefits from remaining in the same house, the large
product costs and the requirement that homeowners maintain the property in the same
condition significantly reduce or eliminate the loan benefits for retirees who wish to do less
maintenance. In our model, retirees value (and exercise) the option to cutback on property
maintenance, an option which is no longer available if a RM is used to borrow against the
house.3
Retirees in our benchmark model do not benefit from RMs. However, the model predicts
that the products are beneficial for individuals who have a weaker bequest motive, for those
with low levels of financial wealth (and pension income) relative to housing wealth, and for
those who have considerable levels of other pre-existing debt. These model predictions are
consistent with the empirical evidence that to date, it has been primarily the poor and those
with large housing wealth relative to the other components of wealth who have made use
of RMs (Davidoff, 2014, Shan, 2011, Warshawsky and Zohrabyan, 2016). For these cases,
our model shows that the expected present value of the cash-flows received by the insurance
agency are negative, meaning that the government is effectively subsidizing RMs. This is an
important point also made by Davidoff (2015) and Lucas (2016), who use simulation results
in a continuous time setting to illustrate the risks of the program to the government.
In the last part of the paper, we use our calibrated model to carry out several experiments.
We show that the elimination of the maintenance requirement can make the products more
appealing to a wider set of retirees, but that it increases the expected government losses. In a
second experiment, we evaluate the effects of removing the government insurance, and show
that it would have to be accompanied by a reduction in borrowing limits to allow lenders to
break even. In a final experiment we focus on product design. One of the risks that retirees
in our model face is that they may be forced to sell their house. We interpret this as a forced
move to a nursing home and use HRS data to parameterize the probability of this event. The
probability of a forced sale makes dissaving using a RM less appealing (as in Michelangeli,
2010). We show that the loans and the insurance against a forced sale act as complements,
and we quantify the complementarities.4
Our paper is related to the previously mentioned large literature on the motives for
dissaving during retirement. Our main contribution to this literature is that we explicitly
3Even though in reality lenders may not always enforce the maintenance requirement, many older bor-
rowers may not wish to violate the loan conditions and find themselves in a situation in which they might
face foreclosure, especially if they derive benefits from aging in place. In addition this is a feature of the
product that retirees may find difficult to understand (Davidoff, Gerhard and Post, 2017).
4Our objective is to investigate the benefits and disadvantages of certain RM features, in the context of
a realistically parameterized model. We do not try to solve for the optimal RM contract among the set of
all possible contracts (Piskorski and Tchistyi, 2010).
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model housing. Early important contributions in the RMs literature include Mayer and
Simons (1994) and Caplin (2002). Mayer and Simons (1994) analyze the potential of RMs
to increase liquid wealth and the income of households, by identifying those with relatively
high levels of housing equity. They estimate that over six million homeowners could use
RMs to increase their monthly income by at least 20%: a large number compared to the
overall size of the RM market. Caplin (2002) analyzes the economic forces that might explain
this gap, and he identifies, among others, transaction costs, moral hazard, and psychological
factors. We explicitly model some of these factors, and we quantitatively evaluate the impact
of RM costs on demand for these mortgages.
More recent papers include Davidoff (2015), Hanewald, Post and Sherris (2016) and
Lucas (2016). Our paper differs from these in its quantitative focus and in trying to match
the patterns observed in the HRS data. In this respect our paper is closer to that of Nakajima
and Telyukova (2017), studying RM demand in a model parameterized using the HRS data,
and to that of Nakajima and Telyukova (2013), studying home equity in retirement in a
model without RMs and with deterministic house prices.
Our paper differs from their work in several important dimensions. First, our model
captures the benefits of aging in place, with the additional utility that the retired homeowner
derives increasing with the number of years in the home. Second, we model the retiree’s
choice regarding whether to maintain the property, provide evidence that it declines with
age, and use this evidence to calibrate the model. We show that this model feature is
important in allowing retirees to decumulate housing wealth in old age. It also reduces the
benefits of RMs. Third, we model RMs as long-term debt contracts and allow for strategic
use of the product. Nakajima and Telyukova (2017) model RMs as a series of rolling one-
period loans which, in the presence of house price risk, underestimates the insurance benefits
of RMs, that arise from the option that borrowers (and their heirs) have to give the house
to lenders in lieu of payment. Davidoff (2015) and Lucas (2016) show that the value derived
from the put option, and its strategic use by borrowers, is high. In our paper, retirees
can make strategic use of the product, but the costs and maintenance requirement of RMs
reduce (or eliminate) their benefits. Finally, we derive implications for the financial position
of lenders and the government agency, and for product design.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the U.S. RM products. Section
3 sets up the model and section 4 describes the parameterization. Section 5 reports the model
results. Section 6 focuses on several experiments. The final section concludes.
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2 Description of products
In the U.S., homeowners have access to several financial products designed to release their
home equity. Among them are the traditional home equity loans and lines of credit that
require future monthly payments, adequate income and credit scores. For this reason, they are
not accessible to many older retired individuals who do not meet the affordability criteria.
An alternative product is a RM. These loans do not require regular interest or principal
repayments since the monthly interest is simply added to the previously outstanding loan
balance.
In the U.S. RM market, the vast majority of the contracts are originated under the
Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program insured by the FHA. Such a program
insulates lenders against the risk of house price declines at a cost that is passed on to
borrowers under the form of an insurance premium. Under the HECM program, homeowners
are allowed to borrow up to a fraction of the value of their house in the form of a line of
credit or an up-front lump-sum. We will designate these two alternatives by drawdown and
lump-sum, respectively.5 The drawdown is adjustable-rate and the lump-sum is fixed-rate
(Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2012).
The loan becomes due when the borrower sells the house, dies, or moves out. If at this
time the proceeds from the house sale are lower than the outstanding loan balance, the
FHA insurance will cover the difference, so that lenders still receive the outstanding balance.
The retiree or the heirs are not liable for any shortfall, but they are entitled to the positive
difference between the proceeds from the house sale and the loan balance. Therefore, from
the point of view of borrowers, RM loans combine the right to borrow against the house
with a put option to give the house to the lender at loan termination, instead of repaying
the outstanding loan balance. This is shown clearly in Davidoff (2015).
RM loans have several requirements and costs. The most significant requirements are
that retirees pay property insurance and taxes, and that they maintain the property in the
same state of repair as it was at loan initiation. If they fail to do so the loan may become
due, and in case of no repayment, the lender has the right to foreclose. The initial loan
fees include an origination fee, a mortgage insurance fee and other closing costs. There are
ongoing loan servicing fees. In addition, borrowers have to pay a loan interest rate that is
higher than the reference index rate. It includes the lender’s margin and an annual mortgage
insurance premium paid to the FHA. The loan rate is the rate at which the interest on the
outstanding loan balance accrues (it is also known as the accrual rate).
5Other less common alternatives are a monthly fixed payment or an annuity.
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The HECM program specifies the loan borrowing limit at the time when the loan is
initiated. It depends on the assessed house value, the borrower’s age (or the age of the
youngest co-borrower), and the expected loan rate at mortgage initiation. For the drawdown,
the expected loan rate is equal to the 10-year risk-free interest rate plus the lender’s margin.
For the lump-sum option, it is simply equal to the initial loan rate (excluding the mortgage
insurance premium). One important feature of the program is that if borrowers do not
exhaust the borrowing limit at loan initiation, the amount that they are allowed to draw
down increases over time (i.e. the credit limit grows). Over the years, there have been a
number of changes to the program. We discuss them in Appendix A.
3 The Model
We model the decisions of single retirees who are homeowners at the beginning of retire-
ment, the risks that they face, and the benefits that they derive from RMs.6 Retirees are
heterogeneous in their pension income and assets, among other dimensions. We take this
heterogeneity into account in the empirical implementation of the model, but in the model
description, to simplify notation, we drop the subscript that denotes the retiree. Our model
is real and the variables should be interpreted accordingly.
3.1 Preferences and health
Survival probabilities. Retired individuals live for a maximum of T periods, but they
face mortality risk. We let pt+1 denote the probability that the retiree is alive at date t+ 1,
conditional on being alive at date t. We follow De Nardi, French and Jones (2010) in choosing
the functional form for these conditional survival probabilities, so that we model them as
a logistic function of a cubic in age, gender, gender interacted with age, health status (ht),
permanent income rank (Yt denotes permanent income), permanent income rank squared,
and permanent income rank interacted with age.
Per-period preferences. The retiree discounts the future exponentially, with discount
factor β. She derives utility from the consumption of housing services (St) and non-durable
goods (Ct). The per-period preferences are given by a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) function:
















where θ is the expenditure share in non-durable consumption, ε is the intra-temporal elas-
ticity of substitution which measures the degree of substitutability between the two goods,
and σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. We assume that housing services are
linear in the size of the property (Ht). The size of the house should be interpreted broadly
as reflecting not only the physical size, but also its quality.
The parameter ωt captures the aging in place benefits or the additional utility that the
retiree derives from remaining the homeowner of the specific house that she had at the
beginning of retirement, where she has lived for a number of years. We assume that these
benefits increase with the number of years in place (denoted At) according to:
ωt = exp(αAt). (2)
When α = 0 it follows that ωt = 1, ∀t and there are no aging in place benefits. Rubin-
stein and Parmelee (1992) argue that remaining in their home becomes more important for
individuals as they grow older, since it allows them to keep the past alive, maintain a sense
of continuity, and strengthen identity. The chosen functional form for the aging in place ben-
efits allows for the possibility that they become increasingly important as individuals grow
older in their home. It distinguishes our model from those which have modeled a preference
for owning relative to renting (e.g. Fisher and Gervais, 2011).7









where td denotes the time of death, b measures the intensity of the bequest motive and κ the
extent to which bequests are a luxury good. Bequeathed wealth is equal to financial wealth
plus housing wealth net of debt outstanding.
Health risk and medical expenditures. Retirees face health and medical expenditure
risks. In each period their health status can be good or bad, with ht = 1 (ht = 0) for
7The functional form that we use implies that the marginal utility of non-durable consumption depends
on the number of years the retiree has lived in his/her home.
8
good (bad) health, and transition probability matrix Π[ht, ht+1](t, Yt, `).
8 These transition
probabilities depend on age, permanent income, and a vector ` of other parameters. Out-of-
pocket medical expenditures, ME(t, Yt, `, ht), are also a function of these variables and of
health status. Medical expenditures are subject to persistent shocks. For tractability, we only
model two health states and we use a small number of points to approximate the medical
expense shocks. We give more details in the data section and in the appendix.
3.2 Pension income, financial assets and taxation
Pension income. In each period t that she is alive, the retiree receives a constant real
pension Yt = Y , for t = 1, ..., T . This is a measure of her permanent income. Its source
may be an inflation-indexed government or private (annuitized) pension that the retiree has
accumulated during her lifetime.
Financial assets. We assume that the individual starts retirement with (non-annuitized)
financial assets or cash-on-hand of X1. In the baseline model, we assume that there is no pre-
existing debt outstanding or, alternatively, the initial cash-on-hand X1 can be interpreted
as being net of the cash used to prepay any pre-existing mortgage debt. We assume that
non-consumed financial assets are invested in a one-period bond.9
For some retirees, the interest received on their financial savings is an important source
of income, and fluctuations in interest rates are an important source of risk. In our model,
interest rates are stochastic. Let r1t denote the log gross real return on a one-period bond,
so that r1t = log(1 +R1t). We assume that it follows an AR(1) process:
r1t = µr(1− φr) + φrr1,t−1 + εt, (4)
where εt is a normally distributed white noise shock with mean zero and variance σ
2
ε .
Taxation and government transfers. Pension and interest income are taxed at rate τ .
Bequeathed wealth above an exemption level E is taxed at τe. For individuals who have low
financial assets, government and social security transfers (TRt) provide a consumption floor.
The level of these transfers is such that individuals are able to consume C of non-durable
8Yogo (2016) develops a life-cycle model of portfolio choice, in which agents face stochastic health depre-
ciation and must choose consumption, health expenditures and portfolio allocation. To simplify, similar to
Palumbo (1999) and others, we take health expenditures to be exogenous, and use HRS data to parameterize
them. See also Koijen, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Yogo (2016), who develop risk measures for the universe of
health and life insurance products.
9We do so to be able to model with more realism the risks that retirees face and the features of RMs.
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goods and to rent a house of size H. The taking out of a RM or the selling of the house, to
the extent that it affects retirees’ financial savings, may also affect their eligibility to receive
these government transfers.
3.3 Housing
Housing and property maintenance choices. The individual starts retirement as a
homeowner of a given house of size H1, in which she has lived for A1 years. The initial price
per unit of housing is PH1 , so that initial house value is P
H
1 H1. In each period the house
depreciates by a constant proportional amount dp. The homeowner must decide whether to
maintain the property (binary choice). The maintenance counteracts property depreciation,
so that house size evolves according to:
Ht+1 = Ht − (dp −mt)Ht (5)
where mt denotes maintenance incurred as a proportion of house size (and value). When
mt = dp, house size remains fixed from one period to the next. In addition, we model a
minimum level of maintenance that retirees must incur:
mt ≥ m. (6)
This minimum level captures the fact that some maintenance may be required to keep
the house in a livable condition. When m > 0, the homeowner’s choices are whether to incur
this minimum level or to set mt equal to dp. Maintenance expenses (in dollar terms, denoted




where PHt is the period t price per unit of housing. Homeowners must pay annual insurance
costs and property taxes equal to a proportion τp of house value. For those who decide to
remain in place At+1 = At + 1.
In each period, retired homeowners decide whether to sell their house and move into
rental accommodation, in which case they must also decide the size of the house to rent.
If they do so, they no longer derive the additional utility benefits from remaining in their
home, so that ωt is equal to one for renters. To capture the illiquid nature of housing, we
assume that a house sale is associated with a monetary cost equal to a proportion λ of the
current house value.
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For tractability, we do not allow homeowners to sell and buy a house of a different size,
nor do we allow transitions from renting to homeownership. The purchase of a smaller house
would be an alternative channel, other than neglected maintenance, for retirees to downsize
while remaining homeowners. However, in a model in which retirees derive utility benefits
from aging in place, doing so may be less attractive than letting the house depreciate. The
empirical evidence presented in the next section shows that retired homeowners tend to
spend less in property maintenance as they age (consistent with the evidence shown by
Davidoff, 2005) and that only a small proportion of them sell their house to buy a smaller
one (consistent with the evidence shown by Venti and Wise, 2004).
The rental cost of housing RCt is a proportion of current house value, equal to the user
cost of housing, plus a rental premium, ϕ. For a house of size Ht it is given by:
RCt = [R1t − Et[(exp(∆pHt+1)− 1] + τp(1− τ) + dp + ϕ]PHt Ht, (8)
where ∆pHt+1 = log(P
H
t+1) − log(PHt ). Thus, renting exposes retirees to fluctuations in the
cost of housing. Setting rents equal to the user cost of housing is a natural benchmark which
is used in several papers in the literature (e.g. Bajari, Chan, Krueger and Miller, 2013).
However, this may expose renters to too much risk if in reality rents fluctuate less than
house prices.
House prices. House prices fluctuate over time. Recall that PHt denotes the date t price
per unit of housing, so that a house of size Ht is worth P
H
t Ht at t. The price of other
consumption goods (the numeraire) is fixed and normalized to one. We assume that changes
in the log price of housing follow a random walk with drift:
∆pHt+1 = µH + ηt+1, (9)
where µH is the mean log house price growth and ηt+1 is a shock that is assumed to be i.i.d.
and normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2η.
Forced house sale. In each period, with a certain probability, homeowners are forced to
sell their house, in which case they move into rental accommodation for the remainder of
the horizon and choose the size of the house to rent (for which they must pay the rental
cost). The probability of a forced sale (pfst ) depends on age and health status. The event is
meant to capture, in a simplistic manner, the risk that retirees might be forced to sell their
house and move to a nursing home. The rental cost that they must pay is in addition to the
previously described medical expenditures. Furthermore, the forced sale event comes with
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an additional one-off medical expenditure of MEfs. Michelangeli (2010) emphasizes the
implication of the forced sale shock for RMs.10
We would like to be able to model the forced sale shock in a more realistic manner,
but the large number of state variables required for the other model features (and for the
RMs in particular) makes it difficult to do so. Nevertheless our model captures the fact
that for a retiree who derives utility benefits from aging in place, the forced sale shock is a
particularly bad event; it means that the individual will no longer obtain those benefits. The
higher medical expenditure makes the event even worse, and as we will see has important
implications for the design of reverse mortgages.
3.4 Drawdown reverse mortgages
Retirees in our model can access home equity by selling their house and moving into rental
accommodation, but they can also do so while remaining in their house by borrowing against
it using a drawdown RM. For tractability, we do not consider other forms of home equity
borrowing. Retirees decide at the initial date (model period 1) whether to set up the RM
loan, and if they do so, in each period they choose the amount of additional funds to draw,
provided that the outstanding loan balance is lower than the borrowing limit. Therefore,
we model drawdown RMs as long-term debt contracts. This is important since, as Davidoff
(2015) and Lucas (2016) have shown, the put component of the product, i.e. the fact that
retirees (and their heirs) can give the house to lenders in lieu of payment (if the value of
the house at loan termination is lower than the outstanding debt), has potentially large
insurance benefits for retirees. The longer the time horizon, the higher the value of the put
component.
In spite of maximizing the benefits of the put option, our model is not as general as one
in which the retiree decides in each period whether to set up the long-term debt contract (if
she has not done so before). In a more general model such as this, the solution would require
two additional state variables, the initial borrowing limit and interest rates in the period in
which the loan is set up. In our analysis these are simply model parameters. However, we
are able to use our model to evaluate the benefits of RMs for different initial conditions and
time horizons (e.g. by varying survival probabilities).
Loan fees. The loan has several fees and costs. We let the parameters (f1, fa, ψ, l1) denote
the initial loan arrangement and valuation fees, the annual service costs, the interest rate
10Michalengeli (2013) studies the effects of purchasing longevity insurance on the consumption and home-
ownership decisions of the elderly.
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premium and the loan limit as a proportion of initial house value, respectively. The loan
arrangement and valuation fees are added to the loan balance. They include an origination
fee, other closing costs, and an initial insurance premium payable to the government (denoted
f1A). The annual service costs are assumed to be a fixed dollar amount.
Loan interest rates and credit limit. The loan interest rate is equal to the one-period
interest rate plus the spread ψ (or R1t + ψ). The loan interest rate determines the rate at
which the interest on outstanding debt accrues. The loan spread includes the lender’s margin
and the annual mortgage insurance premium paid by the lender to the government agency
(denoted ψL and ψA, respectively, with ψ = ψL+ψA). A second interest rate that is relevant
is the expected loan interest rate. It is equal to the ten-year risk-free rate at the time that
the mortgage begins (R10,1) plus the lender’s margin.
To model long-term interest rates, we assume that the log expectation hypothesis holds.
That is, we assume that the log yield on a long-term n-period real bond, rnt = log(1 +Rnt),
is equal to the expected sum of successive log yields on one-period real bonds which are




Et[r1,t+i] + ξ. (10)
This model implies that excess returns on long-term bonds over short-term bonds are un-
predictable, even though changes in short rates are partially predictable.
The initial borrowing limit (B1) is a proportion (l1) of the house value at the initial date
that depends on the retiree’s age and on the expected loan rate. This rate is also the rate at
which the borrowing limit grows over time:
Bt+1 = Bt(1 +R10,1 + ψL). (11)
Borrowers who do not exhaust the credit limit at the initial date will be able to borrow
additional funds in subsequent periods.
Loan balance. We let DSt denote the outstanding loan amount at the beginning of period t,
and DCt the additional amount that the homeowner borrows in that period (the superscript






t + fa)(1 +R1t + ψ). (12)
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with DS1 = f1. Therefore, interest payments due are capitalized.
Maintenance requirement. The contract does not require the borrower to make any
interest payments prior to termination, but it does specify that retirees must pay property
insurance and taxes. In addition, it specifies that borrowers must maintain their homes. The
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau makes this clear in its documentation on RMs:11
“Reverse mortgage borrowers are obligated to pay taxes and insurance and to provide normal
maintenance and upkeep of the property for the life of the loan. If taxes and insurance are
not paid, or if the borrower allows the condition of the property to deteriorate without
making the necessary repairs (the borrower commits “waste”), the lender may consider the
borrower to be in default on the loan and the servicer could foreclose on the home.” In its
documentation on RMs, the New York State Department of Financial Services states: “Take
good care of the house. It should be in the same condition as it was in at the time of closing.”
If borrowers comply with the requirements of the mortgage contract, lenders cannot force
them out of the house, even if they are in a situation of negative home equity.
We assume that borrowers comply with the RM requirements, so that if they decide to
take a loan mt = dp ∀t. If retirees have exhausted the credit line, are in a situation of negative
equity, and do not have enough cash to pay the property taxes, insurance, and maintenance,
they are forced to default.
Loan termination. If at date t the retiree sells the house (or dies), the value of DSt is
deducted from the proceeds of the sale. In this mortgage product, retirees retain homeowner-
ship and benefit/suffer from any increases/decreases in the value of their house (unless there
is negative home equity). Furthermore, they retain the option to discontinue homeownership
in the future. The mortgage loan is non-recourse: if at loan termination there is negative
home equity, the lender seizes the house, but the borrower or her heirs are not liable for any
shortfalls, even if there are other financial assets.
In essence, from the point of view of retirees, RMs allow them to borrow against their
house, and live in it without having to make any interest or principal loan repayments before
loan termination. In addition, borrowers have a put option: at loan termination, they (or
their heirs) can give the house to the lender instead of repaying the outstanding loan amount.
These rights come with several fees, costs and requirements as described above. We simplify
the problem by not considering the possibility of loan refinancing.
11The document is available at: https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/102016 cfpb Reverse
MortgageServicingExaminationProcedures.pdf.
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3.5 Timing and laws of motion for cash-on-hand
The retiree starts the model in period 1 (age 65) as an owner of a house of a certain size
(H1), in which she has lived for A1 years, and with a level of financial wealth (initial cash-
on-hand) of X1. In addition there are initial levels of health (h1) and medical expenditures
(ME1).
12 At the initial date retirees decide whether to take out a RM. If they do so the
(initial) borrowing limit depends on the level of the initial risk-free interest rate (R10,1), the
loan premium and the initial house value.
Retirees who decide to remain homeowners must decide how much to consume of non-
durable goods, and if they decide to take out a RM, how much cash to withdraw using
the loan. In addition they incur maintenance and other housing related expenditures. The
equation describing the evolution of cash-on-hand for those who decide to remain homeowners
is:
Xt+1 = [Xt−Ct−Mt−τp(1−τ)PHt Ht+DCt ][1+R1t(1−τ)]+(1−τ)Yt+1−MEt+1+TRt+1, (13)
where Mt denotes the dollar value of the maintenance expenses incurred in period t. For
homeowners without a RM the additional debt drawn is DCt = 0. At the beginning of
the following period, the new values for the house price, interest rate, health status and
medical expenditures are realized. Cash-on-hand is equal to savings from the previous period
and interest, plus pension income (net of taxes) and government transfers, minus medical
expenditures. Before any decisions for the period are made, the forced house sale shock is
realized.
For individuals who sell their house in period t and become renters the equation describing
the evolution of cash-on-hand is:
Xt+1 = (Xt−Ct−RCt+MAX[(1−λ)PHt Ht−DSt , 0])[1+R1t(1−τ)]+(1−τ)Yt+1−MEt+1+TRt+1.
(14)
Individuals with a RM receive the maximum between the proceeds from the house sale (net
of the proportional transaction costs λ) minus the outstanding loan balance (DSt ) and zero.
This reflects the option that at loan termination they have to give the house to the bank
instead of repaying the outstanding loan balance. For those without a RM at the time of
sale DSt = 0. Renters choose how much non-durable goods to consume and the size of house
12We model the initial cash-on-hand as being net of initial medical expenditures.
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to rent, for which they pay a rental cost RCt.
The equation describing the evolution of cash-on-hand for periods in which individuals
start as renters is similar to equation (14) except that the maximum term which captures
the proceeds from the house sale is not included:
Xt+1 = (Xt − Ct −RCt)[1 +R1t(1− τ)] + (1− τ)Yt+1 −MEt+1 + TRt+1. (15)
Before any decisions for the period are made the mortality shock is realized. In the event










where td denotes the time of death. The first maximum term captures the fact that for a
homeowner with a RM for whom at the time of death the outstanding loan balance is higher
than the proceeds from the house sale, the heirs are not responsible for the difference. The
above equation assumes that when death arrives, retirees do not have the time to go to the
bank and withdraw any unused portion of the credit line. If they do have the time to do so,
that would be the optimal strategy for borrowers who are in a situation of negative equity,
who have not yet exhausted the credit limit, and who know that they are just about to die.
Since in reality some deaths are at least (partly) predictable, we will report some results
for the case in which we relax this assumption. For homeowners who die without a reverse
mortgage, DStd = 0. For retirees who die as renters, the bequeathed wealth is simply the
available cash-on-hand (again net of estate taxes).
3.6 The retiree’s problem, choice and state variables
For renters, the choice variables are how much of non-durable goods to consume (Ct) and the
house size to rent (Ht). For renters in a given permanent income group the state variables
of the problem are age/time, cash-on-hand, the level of interest rates, the level of house
prices, health status and medical expenditures. We let SRt denote this set of state variables,
or SRt = [t,Xt, r1t, P
H
t , ht,MEt]. For each permanent income group, pension income is fixed
throughout, making it a model parameter and not a state variable. The retiree-renter makes
choices in each period so as to maximize expected lifetime utility:
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V Rt (.) = MAXCt,HtU(Ct, Ht) + βEt[pt+1V
R
t+1(.) + (1− pt+1)v(Wt+1)] (17)
subject to the law of motion for cash-on-hand for renters (equation 15), the equations de-
scribing the evolution of the exogenous model variables, and non-negativity constraints on
non-durable consumption and housing choices.
Homeowners in a given permanent income group and without a RM (denoted NoRM)
decide in each period whether to sell the house and move to renting, by comparing the
remaining expected lifetime utility of the two alternatives. In the event that they decide to
remain homeowners, the choice variables are how much of the non-durable good to consume





t , ht,MEt, Ht] includes the current house size (Ht). In periods in which they
decide to remain homeowners (and are not hit by the forced sale shock), they solve:
V H,NoRMt (.) = MAXCt,MtU(Ct, Ht) + βEt[pt+1V
H,NoRM
t+1 (.) + (1− pt+1)v(Wt+1)]. (18)
Homeowners with a RM must choose whether to remain so or to sell the house and move
to renting in which case the loan is terminated. If individuals decide not to sell, the choice
variables are how much of the non-durable good to consume and how much additional cash
to draw from the loan (DCt ), if the outstanding loan balance is below the limit. The set
of state variables SH,RMt = [t,Xt, r1t, P
H
t , ht,MEt, D
S
t ] includes the currently outstanding
loan balance (DSt ). Recall that in each period, homeowners with a RM set mt = dp, so that
Ht = H1 ∀t. Thus, for these individuals Ht is a model parameter and not a state variable.
We solve the model for several alternative initial conditions, including the size of the
house with which the retiree starts the model and the level of period 1 interest rates (R10,1),
which is important for the credit limit. The values for these variables are set at the initial date
and are constant throughout the optimization problem. One could think of them as either
initial conditions or more generally as state variables whose value is constant throughout.
To simplify notation, we treat them as model parameters.
Let V H,RMt (.) denote the value function for homeowners with a RM. In periods in which
they decide to remain homeowners (and are not hit by the forced sale shock), they solve:
V H,RMt (.) = MAXCt,DCt U(Ct, Ht) + βEt[pt+1V
H,RM
t+1 (.) + (1− pt+1)v(Wt+1)]. (19)
The retiree with a RM makes consumption and debt choices subject to the law of motion
for cash-on-hand, the equations describing the evolution of the exogenous model variables,
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the equation describing the evolution of the outstanding loan balance, the borrowing limit
constraint, the constraint that she must fully maintain the property, and a non-negativity
constraint on non-durable consumption.
We calculate the benefits of RMs by comparing the initial date value functions of retirees
with and without a RM: V H,RM1 (.) and V
H,NoRM
1 (.), respectively. Retirees who are better
off with a reverse mortgage choose to set up the loan at the initial date (RMC1 = 1, zero
otherwise), where RMC1 is a binary variable that captures the first period loan choice.
3.7 Lump-sum reverse mortgage
For most of the analysis, we will focus on drawdown RMs, but we will also solve the model for
the case of lump-sum products. In a lump-sum loan, all available funds are drawn up-front.
The interest rate is equal to the ten-year risk-free interest rate at the initial date (R10,1),
plus the mortgage premium (ψ). The equation describing the evolution of the outstanding
debt for periods t > 1 is given by:
DSt+1 = (D
S
t + fa)(1 +R10,1 + ψ), (20)
with DS1 = f1 + l1P
H
1 H1. Lump-sum RMs have analogous fees and requirements to those
described for the drawdown loans, which we do not repeat here. Their model solution is
simpler. Since all funds are borrowed up-front there is no debt choice in periods subsequent
to the first. The level of initial interest rates together with the amount borrowed and loan
period determine the outstanding debt in each period, which reduces the number of state
variables.
3.8 Private lenders, the insurance agency, and pricing kernel
In our baseline model, loan losses are insured by a government agency. This describes the
current U.S. experience under the HECM program. However, later on we will consider the
possibility that private lenders bear the risk of house price declines: in such a setting, the
cash-flows of lenders and the government agency described below are consolidated.13
Lenders. At mortgage initiation, in period 1, the lenders’ (L) cash-flows are equal to the
initial funds disbursed plus the initial mortgage insurance premium paid by lenders to the
government agency (f1A) (but added to the outstanding loan balance):
13In the U.K., there is no government insurance and lenders bear house price risk. In the U.S., there are
non-government insured RMs, but the size of this market is very small.
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CFL1 = −DC1 − f1A. (21)
In each subsequent period t prior to loan termination, the cash-flows received by lenders are:
CFLt = −DCt − ψADSt , (22)
where ψA denotes the annual mortgage insurance premium payable to the government agency.
It is important to note that these cash-flows do not take into account the administrative and
advertising costs incurred by lenders. Their present value should be interpreted accordingly.




The insurance agency. The insurance agency (A) collects the mortgage insurance premia
in periods prior to loan termination, and at loan termination it receives:
CFAt′ = MIN [0, (1− λ)PHt′ Ht′ −DSt′ ]. (24)
This reflects the fact that if house values are lower than the outstanding loan balance, the
government agency must compensate private lenders for the difference. Note that since
borrowers are required to maintain their house, Ht′ = H1.
Pricing kernel. We will use U.S. RM data on premia and borrowing limits to parameterize
the model. However, we are also interested in evaluating the extent to which the mortgage
insurance is correctly priced or, in the absence of government insurance, whether mortgage
margins allow lenders to achieve a positive expected present value of future cash-flows.14
We need to specify a discount rate to calculate the present values. We report results for
both the risk-free interest rate and a risk-adjusted discount rate. To calculate the latter we
follow Campbell and Cocco (2015) in specifying an exogenous pricing kernel. We give details
in Appendix B. The discount rates are lower for cash-flows that occur when house prices
are low, so that such cash-flows are more valuable. Even though lenders do not face credit
risk (which is insured by the government) the risk-adjusted discount factors are relevant for
them since they face cash-flow risk that is correlated with house price movements (retirees’
decisions to draw down on the loans are correlated with house prices).
14In order to perform these calculations, we assume that at mortgage arrangement, the insurance agency
and lenders observe the relevant parameters that influence retiree survival probabilities.
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Solution technique. The numerical techniques that we use to solve our model are standard
(Deaton, 1991). We discretize the state space and the choice variables. We approximate the
random variables using Gaussian quadrature. We solve the model backwards, selecting the
optimal choices at each data using grid search, and we use the optimal policy functions to
simulate the model. We give more details in Appendix B.
4 The Data
We use several data sources to parameterize the model and to provide further evidence in
support of some of its features. In addition we describe the moments that we target in the
calibration. Our main data source is the HRS data from 1996 to 2012. We use the Rand
version of the data and combine it with information from the core and exit interviews.
Following De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) we restrict the analysis to single, retired
individuals who are aged 65 or over. Furthermore, since our model is one of homeowners
at the beginning of retirement we exclude those individuals who are renters at this age. We
only observe those individuals who are homeowners at age 65 in 1996 (the first year in the
HRS data) up to a maximum age of 81. Therefore, to generate age profiles that span the
full retirement, we need to use data from other birth cohorts, corresponding to individuals
who are older than 65 in 1996. The cohorts that we use are those for individuals born in
1915-19, 1920-24, 1925-29, and 1930-34. They are the cohorts with more data observations,
as described in Appendix C. For each of these, we select only those individuals who are
homeowners when they enter the data.
4.1 Pension income and assets
We solve the model for each of the cohorts with different starting ages and initial conditions.
More precisely, we take the initial conditions for homeowners at age 65 in the cohort born
in 1930-34, for homeowners at age 70 in the cohort born in 1925-29, for homeowners at age
75 in the cohort born in 1920-24, and finally for homeowners at age 80 in the cohort born
in 1915-19.
We follow De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) and calculate for each individual a measure
of his/her permanent/retirement income, by averaging the annual real non-asset income over
the years in which the individual appears in the data. We use this measure of permanent
income (PI) to group individuals into quintiles. Table 1 reports median retirement income
for two of the cohorts. It also reports, for the different permanent income groups, initial
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median real financial wealth (excluding housing wealth, but net of debt outstanding) and
median initial house values. The dollar values that we report are real 1996 dollars.
Table 1 shows that individuals with higher permanent income tend to have higher fi-
nancial wealth and higher housing wealth. Venti and Wise (1991) provide similar evidence
on the relationship between the income and the housing equity of the elderly. We use the
median income values to parameterize Y and median housing wealth to parameterize H1.
We make the assumption that initial house size is the same for individuals in a given co-
hort/permanent income group to reduce the dimensionality of the problem. Since we are
calculating initial financial wealth net of outstanding debt, the values are negative for some
of the groups shown in Table 1. However, their initial cash-on-hand is positive (since their
income, which we add to the net initial financial assets to obtain initial cash-on-hand, is
larger than the absolute value of the negative net financial assets). For each individual, we
calculate the number of years she has been living in the current residence. We use the median
values for this variable for each of the groups to parameterize A1 (shown in the last column
of Table 1).
Table 1: Permanent income, assets, health status and number of years in resi-
dence.
PI Income Financial Housing Prop. bad Years in
group (thous.) wealth (th.) wealth (th.) health resid.
At age 65, cohort born 1930-1934
1 5.7 2.2 48.0 0.45 16
2 8.4 -2.0 60.0 0.24 19
3 11.6 15.1 67.0 0.21 18
4 14.4 15.0 96.6 0.20 19
5 27.7 92.0 100.0 0.29 18
At age 75, cohort born 1920-1924
1 7.2 -0.7 41.4 0.50 25
2 9.1 7.2 91.5 0.20 26
3 11.6 18.3 62.6 0.43 24
4 14.8 36.1 79.9 0.36 23
5 20.5 262.8 144.4 0.26 25
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4.2 Health status, survival probabilities and medical expenditures
Individuals in the HRS data are asked to rate their health. We use this information to
construct a dummy variable that takes the value of one for retirees who report fair or poor
health, and zero for individuals who report good, very good, or excellent health. The mean
of this variable for those retirees aged 65 in the 1930-34 birth cohort and for those aged 75
in the 1920-24 birth cohort are shown in Table 1. The proportions of individuals who report
fair or poor health are significantly higher for those in the lowest permanent income group.15
We use this information to parameterize initial health status: we set the proportions of
individuals in bad health at the initial age in the model simulation equal to those in the
data.
We follow De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) in our estimation of the transition prob-
ability matrix for health status. The probability of bad health is assumed to be a logistic
function of a cubic in age, gender, gender interacted with age, health status, health status
interacted with age, permanent income rank, permanent income rank squared, and perma-
nent income rank interacted with age. We use a logistic function and the same explanatory
variables to estimate survival probabilities. The maximum age is ninety-five, so that the
maximum number of model periods (T ) is equal to thirty. We give more details in Appendix
C.
We use HRS data to construct a measure of out-of-pocket medical expenditures. We
model the mean of log medical expenses as a function of a quadratic in age, gender, gender
interacted with age, health status, and health status interacted with age. In Figure 2, we
plot the estimated age profiles for three of the permanent income groups. This figure shows
that mean out-of-pocket medical expenditures increase with age and permanent income.
Individuals with fair or poor health face higher medical expenses than those in good health.
The analysis of the residuals of the log medical expenditures regression shows higher
variability at older ages. We take this into account by letting the variance of the medical
expenditures shocks increase with age. To estimate the increase we first calculate for each age
(and permanent income group) the variance of the residuals of the log medical expenditures
regression, and then regress them on a second order polynomial in age. In addition, we allow
for persistence in the medical expenditure shocks. The estimated first order auto regression
coefficients are equal to 0.70, 0.71 and 0.73 for individuals in permanent income groups one,
three, and five respectively.
15These patterns may in part be due to reverse causality: if there is persistence in health status, retirees
in poor health will also be more likely to have had poor health in the years prior to retirement and may have
accumulated lower retirement benefits (Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 2011b).
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Figure 2: Medical expenditures
For tractability, the medical expenditure process that we use is simpler than the ones in
French and Jones (2004) or De Nardi, French and Jones (2010) and the age increase that
we estimate is smaller than theirs. We (partially) address these differences and incorporate
medical expenditures tail risk in the model through the forced sale shock. We explain this
in the next section. We give further details on medical expenditures in Appendix C.
4.3 Moving and evidence on aging in place
We study the moving decisions of retirees in the HRS data. For those who are alive in any
two consecutive waves of the survey and who are homeowners in the earlier one, we create
dummy variables for a house sale and move to homeownership (of a different house), to
renting, and to a nursing home. We calculate the average of these dummy variables by age.
The survey is biennial but we convert the estimated transition probabilities into annual values
and calculate averages by five-year age group (this reduces the significant age variation due
the relatively small number of observations in some cells). The results are shown in Table 2.
Early on in retirement there is a small proportion of homeowners (around 1%) who decide
to sell their house and buy another one. To simplify the analysis, we have not considered this
possibility in the model, so it is re-assuring to find that in the data only a small proportion
of retirees do so. Furthermore, even though they are still small, as Table 2 shows, the largest
moving probabilities occur later in life for individuals who sell their house to move into rental
accommodation and for those who move into a nursing home. The moves into renting are
captured endogenously in the model.
We parameterize the probability of a forced sale (pfst ) in the model using the data in
the last two columns of Table 2. As expected, the probabilities are higher for individuals in
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Table 2: Annual moving probabilities.
Age Move to Move to Move to nursing
group renting homeownership Good health Bad health
65-69 0.013 0.011 0.001 0.001
70-74 0.011 0.013 0.000 0.001
75-79 0.015 0.009 0.002 0.006
80-84 0.019 0.007 0.003 0.009
85-89 0.018 0.009 0.012 0.027
90-94 0.025 0.001 0.018 0.060
bad health and increase with age. To parameterize the additional medical expenditures in
the case of a forced sale (MEfs), we calculate their value in the year in which individuals
report moving to a nursing home. Their mean (median) value is 10,500 (5,945) dollars. We
set MEfs equal to 10,000 dollars.
A hypothesis consistent with place attachment is that retired homeowners who have lived
longer in their current residence are more attached to their homes (and local communities)
and are less likely to sell their houses and move. In order to test this hypothesis, we have
taken the sample of single retired homeowners over the age of 65 and we have created dummy
variables for a move (other than to a nursing home) and a move to a nursing home, between
times t − 2 and t (corresponding to two consecutive waves of the survey, two years apart).
For each of these dummy variables, we have estimated probit models by regressing them on
age, number of years in the current residence (measured at time t − 2), and dummies for
bad health (at t− 2 and at t). The estimated marginal effects are shown in the second and
third columns of Table 3.
Interestingly, we find that the longer the individual has been in his/her house, the lower
the probability that he/she will move (other than to a nursing home): an additional year
in place reduces the probability of a move by 12 basis points. In contrast, for explaining
moves to a nursing home, the statistically (and economically) significant variables are age
and health status (at t): an age increase of one year increases the probability of a move
to a nursing home by 23 basis points and bad health at time t by 1.4%. The fact that bad
health at t − 2 is not statistically significant suggests that individuals move to a nursing
home between times t− 2 and t in response to a deterioration in health during this period.
The small marginal effects of the explanatory variables reflect the small probability that
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Table 3: Evidence on aging in place.
Independent Move other than Move to
variables to nursing home nursing home
Age at t 0.000 0.002
(-0.12) (6.62)
Number of years in residence at t-2 -0.001 0.000
(-5.64) (-0.46)
Dummy for bad health at t-2 0.009 0.011
(1.11) (0.43)
Dummy for bad health at t 0.005 0.014
(0.63) (3.25)
Number of observations 4,634 4,634
individuals will move as they grow older.16
Another interesting piece of evidence on the benefits of aging in place can be found in
Davidoff (2005). Using information on the perceived quality of the house by owners in the
AHS data, he finds evidence that older homeowners tend to think more highly of similar
homes than younger ones, which may result from place attachment being more important
for the old.
4.4 Interest rates, house prices, and reverse mortgages
In the first panel of Table 4, we report the annual parameters that we use for the interest
rate and house price processes. For interest rates we use data on U.S. 1-year treasury yields,
deflated using the consumer price index. For house prices we use S&P/Case-Shiller Composite
Home Price data for the 20 major U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) from 1987 to
2014. The mean log house price growth across these MSAs is 0.002. The standard deviation
of each MSA varies between 4% and 14%. The median is 7.4%. These standard deviations
capture the MSA-wide house price risk, but not idiosyncratic risk of specific houses within
each city. This is why in our base case we use a standard deviation of 10% (we will also solve
the model for alternative values).
Over the years there have been several changes to the HECM program. Therefore, we
16We have also estimated regressions that allow for the possibility that the number of years in the current
residence and age affect moving probabilities in a non-linear way, by including the square of these variables
among the regressors. The relatively small number of observations makes it hard to identify such effects and
the estimated coefficients on these quadratic terms were not statistically significant.
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Table 4: Model parameters.
Interest rates and house prices
Mean log real rate µr 0.012
Stdev of the real rate σε 0.018
Log real rate AR(1) coefficient φr 0.825
Term premium ξ 0.005
Mean log real house price growth µH 0.002
Stdev house price return ση 0.10
Reverse mortgage
Loan origination fees 0.02
Initial mortgage ins. premium f1,A 0.02
Other closing costs 0.02
Initial borrowing limit l1 0.564
Annual servicing fees fa $420
Annual mortgage ins. premium ψA 0.005
Lender’s margin ψL 0.0165
Tax rates and other parameters
Income tax rate τ 0.2
Property tax rate τp 0.015
Estate tax rate τe 0.4
Estate tax exemption level E 600k
Property depreciation dp 0.02
Rental premium ϕ 0.01
Transaction costs of house sale λ 0.06
Lower bound on non-dur. cons., house size C,H 4.8k, 15 units
use historical data to parameterize the RM loans that correspond to the early part of our
sample. In Appendix A we give further details on the data sources, we discuss the most
significant historical changes that have occurred in the program and we report parameter
values for later years.
Table 4 reports the baseline parameters. The values for the loan origination fees and
mortgage insurance premia (both initial and annual) are from several mortgagee letters.
Other closing costs (in addition to the origination fees) include the appraisal of the property,
the title insurance and inspection fees. A realistic value is 2% of the value of the property
(Davidoff, 2015). The most common index for the drawdown loans is the 1-year Treasury
rate. In order to obtain an estimate of lenders’ margins, we have used Treasury rates data
and data from the HECM Single-Family Portfolio Snapshot that includes information on
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loan interest rates.
The value for the initial borrowing limit is obtained from the HECM historical principal
limit factor tables. These tables give us the borrowing limit as a proportion of the appraised
house value17 as a function of the age of the borrower (or the youngest borrower in joint
applications) and the expected interest rate on the loan. The initial age in our model is 65
and we parameterize the initial borrowing limit accordingly. The value for the servicing fees
is 420 dollars per year (35 dollars per month, mortgagee letter 98-3).
4.5 Tax rates and other parameters
The last panel of Table 4 reports other model parameters. The HRS has data for younger
individuals in the 55 to 64 age group who are still working. The average housing maintenance
expenses for these individuals are 0.021. We assume that this is the average annual level
of maintenance expenses that exactly offsets depreciation and set dp equal to 0.02. The
remaining values of the user cost of housing and property taxes are from Himmelberg, Mayer
and Sinai (2005). The transaction costs of a house sale are equal to 0.06. The tax rate τe is
0.40 and the estate tax exemption level is 600,000 dollars.
The consumption floor is such that the retiree is guaranteed a certain level of non-durable
consumption and in addition he/she is able to rent a house of a given minimum size. We use
the 1996 distribution of house values in the HRS data to parameterize this minimum house
size (H): we assume that it is equal to the house size corresponding to percentile 10 of the
distribution of house values in this year, of fifteen thousand dollars. We can think of this as
corresponding to fifteen units of housing. As house prices increase, these same fifteen units
will correspond to house values larger than fifteen thousand dollars. As house and rental
prices fluctuate from year to year, so does the monetary value of the (overall) floor. We set
the guaranteed level of non-durable consumption at 4.8 thousand dollars. This implies an
overall floor of between 5.8 and 7.1 thousand 1996 US dollars (for the realizations of house
prices and rental rates during the sample period).
One can think of this consumption floor as arising from Medicaid transfers (De Nardi,
French and Jones, 2016). The role of housing wealth in Medicaid is complex. Even though
U.S. states need to follow Federal guidelines, each state makes Medicaid policy choices and
administers its program separately, meaning that there are differences in eligibility and rules
across states. However, thinking about these rules more broadly, there are some similarities
between them and what happens in our model. According to Medicaid rules, the individual’s
17Or of the maximum claim amount if it is lower than the house value. The maximum claim amount is
the lesser of the property appraised value and the applicable FHA loan limit.
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home is excluded when determining eligibility. Whether the individual is entitled to benefits
depends on his/her income and assets other than the home. In our model, individuals receive
government transfers if, in order to meet the required medical expenditures, they are left
with insufficient financial assets to achieve the lower bound in consumption. Similar to what
happens in the program, the likelihood that they will receive the transfers depends on their
income and the level of their financial assets (excluding the home).18
4.6 Target moments
Our target moments are the 5-year age profiles of homeownership rates, total wealth and
maintenance expenses, for the different permanent income groups. To calculate the moments
we restrict the data to the same sample of single retired homeowners at the beginning of the
HRS sample period in birth cohorts from 1930-34, 1925-29, 1920-24, and 1915-19 and track
them over time. For each cohort and age, we calculate homeownership rates and median
total wealth (which includes housing wealth). We then calculate their average over 5-year
age groups (65-69, 70-74, and so on up to 90-94) and different cohorts (for the first and
last age groups there are data for only one cohort). We do these calculations by permanent
income group. In Table 5 we report values for permanent income groups one, three and five,
spanning the income distribution.
Homeownership rates decline slowly with age and are still high late in life. As expected,
total wealth is higher for higher permanent income groups at all ages. In spite of the cal-
culation of five-year averages the last three columns of Table 5 still show significant age
variability in total wealth for each income group. Increases in wealth late in life may be due
to sample selection: wealthier individuals are likely to be healthier and to live longer.
Due to data limitations, to calculate the target moments for maintenance expenses we
need to follow a different approach. The data are from the Consumption and Activities Mail
Survey (CAMS), which is a supplementary survey to the HRS. The first wave did not take
place until 2001 and it covered five thousand households selected at random from those who
participated in the HRS 2000 core survey. The same households were then interviewed every
two years. We have used data from seven waves up to 2013. The survey collects information on
18In addition, Medicaid eligibility rules do not prevent individuals from using RMs. In our model, individ-
uals are allowed to take out a reverse mortgage and do not lose the entitlement to transfers if they do so. A
house sale in our model leads to an increase in cash-on-hand (depending on the existing home equity), which
reduces the likelihood of receiving government transfers. This is in the spirit of what happens in Medicaid.
When the homeowner moves permanently out of the house, it is no longer a “home,” it becomes a countable
asset, and its equity must be spent on the homeowner’s health costs. Therefore even though our model is
not designed to think of many of the complicated rules regarding housing wealth in Medicaid, it captures
some (not necessarily all) of its broad principles.
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Table 5: Target moments.
Age Homeown. rates Maint. expenses Total wealth (thous.)
group PI 1 PI 3 PI 5 PI 1 PI 3 PI 5 PI 1 PI 3 PI 5
65-69 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.017 0.018 0.017 61.6 128.1 178.2
70-74 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.014 0.015 0.014 81.2 144.1 180.7
75-79 0.92 0.92 0.96 0.014 0.016 0.014 44.5 106.2 196.4
80-84 0.87 0.83 0.91 0.012 0.014 0.012 52.4 101.8 233.2
85-89 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.012 0.013 0.012 49.0 84.5 221.1
90-94 0.70 0.73 0.77 0.007 0.009 0.007 70.8 76.4 169.1
annual spending on housing maintenance, including materials bought directly and services.
We calculate maintenance expenses as a proportion of house value. To reduce the potential
impact of outliers, we winsorize the variables at the one percent level.
We select the sample of single retired homeowners over the age of 65. Therefore, due to
the shorter sample period and number of observations, we no longer restrict the sample to
the same four cohorts as before. To calculate age profiles we regress maintenance expenses as
a proportion of house value on age, cohort, and permanent income group dummies. Most of
the cohort and permanent income group dummies are not statistically significant. In Table
5 we report the averages over five-year age groups of maintenance expenses. There is an
age decline in such expenses from an annual average of 0.018 for the 65-69 age group to
values of around 0.01 late in life (the differences between the 65-69 and 90-94 age groups are
statistically significant).
We have calculated average maintenance expenses for single individuals in the 55 to 64
age group who are still working and compared them to those incurred by retired individuals
in the 65 to 74 age group. The corresponding values are 0.021 and 0.015. These are sig-
nificantly different from each other at the one percent level. Due to the collinearity among
the variables, it is hard to separate the effects of age and retirement on maintenance ex-
penses. However, this evidence shows that older retired homeowners spend considerably less
on housing maintenance than those approaching retirement age, and they decrease housing
maintenance as they age. There may be several reasons for this. One reason, captured by
our model, is that retirees reduce housing maintenance as a way of dissaving from their most
important asset, and of having more cash available to meet medical or other expenditures.
Another possibility is that older individuals find it more difficult to deal with contractors,
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and therefore refrain from doing so and from maintaining their house.19
5 Model Results
We first briefly describe the simulated data, followed by an analysis of the model fit and the
calibrated parameters, then we turn our attention to RMs.
5.1 Simulated data
We solve the model separately for individuals in each cohort and permanent income group,
and use it to generate simulated data. The initial conditions (financial assets, median income,
median house values and the number of years living in the residence) for each cohort and
permanent income group are taken from the HRS data. To capture heterogeneity in initial
financial assets, in the simulated data we set their value for each one third of the individuals
to the value that corresponds to percentiles 17, 50 and 83 of the corresponding distribution of
financial assets in the HRS data. Heterogeneity in income and initial house sizes is captured
through the differences that exist across permanent income groups and cohorts. We set the
proportion of individuals who are initially in bad health equal to those in the HRS data.
In our model, real interest rates and house price changes are stochastic, with two possible
values for each of these. In the simulations, we set the values of the real interest rate equal to
the values that better match the data over the 1996-2012 period (the right panel of Figure
3 compares the data and the model). For house prices, we try to match the changes in the
U.S. Case-Shiller composite index. In the model, house price growth can be low or high. In
the simulated data, we set the proportions of individuals who face the low/high value so that
the average house price change matches the index (left panel of Figure 3). This introduces
heterogeneity in the simulated data which may be interpreted as reflecting geographical
differences in house price changes.
We use the policy functions to generate simulated data for each cohort/permanent income
group over a fifteen year horizon. This simulated data is used to calculate homeownership
rates, maintenance expenses and median total wealth for each cohort/permanent income
group and age. Finally, we calculate averages first over five-year age groups and then for
each age group over the different cohorts, exactly as we have done in the calculation of the
target moments.20
19If older individuals bear higher non-monetary costs of maintaining their house, this would make the
maintenance requirement of RMs more costly.
20One difference between our simulated data and the HRS data is that the former is annual whereas the
30
Figure 3: House prices and interest rates.
When calibrating the preference parameters, we assume that retirees do not have access
to RMs. Even though they have been available for many years, the number of loans originated
has been very small, particularly during the early part of the HRS data sample. The extent
to which the calibrated parameters generate demand for RMs provides an out-of-sample test
of the model.
We use a minimum distance criterion to choose among parameter values. More precisely,
we solve our model and generate simulated data for different combinations of preference
parameter values. For each, we calculate the weighted sum of squared difference between the
model moments and the data moments. For the weighing matrix, we use the diagonal matrix
with the inverse of the variance of the data moments in the main diagonal. We select the
combination of preference parameter values for which the calculated weighted sum is lowest.
5.2 Calibrated parameters and model fit
Table 6 reports the calibrated parameters. Before we discuss their values, we evaluate the
ability of the model to replicate the targeted moments. Figure 4 compares model and data
along the income distribution (income groups one, three and five in Panels A through C,
respectively). The model generates the slow age decline in homeownership rates and the age
decline in maintenance expenses observed in the data. Furthermore, the model replicates
relatively well the age profiles of total wealth for the different permanent income groups.
Figure 4 also plots the age profiles of median financial wealth generated by the model
compared to those calculated from the HRS data (in a similar manner to total wealth).
latter is biennial. We abstract from this difference when calculating the five-year age group averages.
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Table 6: Calibrated parameters.
Description Parameter Value
Discount factor β 0.97
Intertemporal elasticity of subs. σ 0.333
Aging in place α 0.019
Non-durable cons exp. share θ 0.70
Intratemporal elasticity of subs. ε 1.25
Bequest motive intensity b 12
Bequest motive curvature κ 6, 000
Minimum housing maintenance m 0.01
These were not directly targeted by the calibration, but again the model replicates them
relatively well (with the exception of the financial wealth of the highest income group late
in life, which is underestimated by the model).
Even though overall the model seems to provide a reasonably good fit, there is one aspect
in which it is less successful, which we would like to highlight: it tends to overestimate
homeownership rates in the 80-84 and 85-89 age groups. One possible explanation is that in
reality some individuals may have reasons to sell that are not captured by the model (e.g.
to be nearer to a family member).
As a further check on the model, we have calculated the predicted mean fraction of con-
sumption expenditures in housing. For our calibrated parameters, and for permanent income
groups one, three and five, they are equal to 0.22, 0.24 and 0.18, respectively. Therefore the
highest income agents in our model spend a relatively smaller proportion on housing. This
is mainly due to the fact that their houses are less valuable relative to their income and
financial assets. We compare these values to those from the Aggregate Expenditure Share
Tables provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).21 The latter vary depending
on whether one considers a broad definition of housing expenditures that includes (among
other things) household furnishings and equipment or a narrower definition that includes
only shelter. The average values for those aged 65 years and older over the 1996 to 2012
period are 0.332 and 0.174, respectively. The values predicted by our model fall in between
these two. If one considers differences across income quintiles (for all age groups) in the BLS
data, the values are 0.38 (housing) and 0.22 (shelter) for those in the bottom income quintile
and 0.31 (housing) and 0.18 (shelter) for those in the top income quintile. Therefore, those
21They are available at https://www.bls.gov/cex/csxashar.htm
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Figure 4: Model versus data target moments.
Panel A: Permanent income group 1
Panel B: Permanent income group 3
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in the top income quintile spend less on housing than those in the bottom quintile: this is
similar to what happens in our model.22
We now discuss the calibrated parameters. The utility benefits from aging in place are
important: the calibrated value of α is 0.019 implying a value for ωt that increases from
roughly 1.5 to 2.5 for an increase in the number of years living in the home from 18 to 48
(as shown in Figure 5). Recall that ωt is the parameter that multiplies housing services in
the utility function capturing the extra utility benefits of remaining in the same house in
which the individual has retired, compared to a similar size rental unit.23 To quantitatively
evaluate its effects, we have solved our model for α equal to zero (so that ωt = 1 ∀t) while
keeping the other parameters at their benchmark values.
Figure 5: Aging in place utility benefits.
The results are shown in the third row of each of the panels of Table 7. In order to keep
the length of the paper manageable, in this table we report averages for ten-year age groups
(instead of five) and for individuals in the middle quintile of the income distribution (the
effects that we describe are similar for the other income groups). For comparison, the first
two rows of each panel report the HRS data moments and the model generated ones for the
calibrated parameters, respectively. The table shows that when we remove the benefits from
aging in place, agents in the model want to sell too early compared to the data: homeown-
22In appendix B we investigate the extent to which our model generates bequests that are comparable to
those in the HRS data.
23One way to interpret a value of ωt of say two is that the individual derives as much utility from a given
house where she has lived for most of her life (36 years), and which brings her good memories, as from a
rented house which is twice as large to which she does not have a psychological attachment.
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Table 7: Other preference parameters and model features.
Age group 65-74 75-84 85-94 65-74 75-84 85-94
Homeownership rate Maintenance
Data 0.98 0.88 0.75 0.017 0.014 0.011
Calibrated parameters 1.00 0.97 0.74 0.015 0.014 0.011
No aging in place benefits α = 0 0.91 0.42 0.06 0.014 0.012 0.010
No maint. choice m = 0.02 0.97 0.82 0.55 0.020 0.020 0.020
Minimum maint. m = 0 1.00 0.99 0.85 0.013 0.009 0.003
No bequest motive b = 0 0.97 0.75 0.15 0.013 0.012 0.010
Bequest curvature κ = 0 1.00 0.97 0.79 0.015 0.014 0.011
Intrat. elast. subs. ε = 0.8 0.86 0.76 0.27 0.012 0.011 0.010
Total wealth (thous.) Fin. savings (thous.)
Data 136.1 104.0 80.4 20.4 19.3 15.6
Calibrated parameters 98.3 106.9 89.5 14.4 10.5 17.8
No aging in place benefits α = 0 94.7 86.8 53.0 21.1 58.5 51.4
No maint. choice m = 0.02 99.8 103.9 86.3 16.3 21.2 38.7
Minimum maint. m = 0 96.9 104.8 89.3 13.0 9.2 3.4
No bequest motive b = 0 95.0 93.4 35.1 12.8 26.4 26.3
Bequest curvature κ = 0 98.8 108.1 91.8 14.7 11.3 10.1
Intrat. elast. subs. ε = 0.8 92.2 96.1 58.7 20.6 31.5 43.4
ership rates decline to 0.42 and 0.06 for the 75-84 and 85-94 age groups, respectively.24 An
additional interesting effect is that there is a significantly larger reduction in total wealth
with age, for the same bequest motive intensity. The main reason is that since individuals
sell at an earlier age, they do not benefit from the large house price increases that occurred
during the sample period. Realized bequests in our model are to some extent driven by the
desire to age in place and the realized house price changes.
In the next two rows of Table 7, we report the results for experiments that are aimed at
understanding the role that maintenance plays in our model. We first eliminate maintenance
as a choice variable and set mt = dp = 0.02 ∀t (while keeping all other parameters at their
calibrated values, including the benefits from aging in place). Giving the retirees the choice
of cutting back on housing maintenance allows them to adjust their housing consumption
and saving, and makes them want to remain homeowners until later in life: the average
24It is instructive to briefly consider what triggers a house sale and a move to renting in the model. As
in the data, those who decide to sell earlier have lower cash-on-hand and higher house values relative to
cash-on-hand. These constitute an incentive for individuals to tap into their home equity through a house
sale.
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homeownership rate for those in the 85-94 age group drops from 0.74 to 0.55 when we force
them to always fully maintain their house. In the model, the ability to cut back on housing
maintenance is an option that is particularly valuable for older retirees, as a way to release
the cash needed to meet medical or other expenditures and reduce housing wealth. Davidoff
(2005) presents empirical evidence that the elderly do reduce housing maintenance.
When we let agents choose whether to maintain the house but we set the minimum level
of maintenance equal to zero, the model generates counterfactually low maintenance rates
late in life, equal to 0.3% per year for the 85-94 age group compared to 1.1% in the data. We
interpret this minimum level of maintenance as that needed to keep the house in a habitable
condition.
In addition to a precautionary savings motive arising from uncertain life span and medical
expenditures, the literature has proposed a bequest motive as a reason for why retirees do not
run down their wealth faster during retirement (see for example Bernheim (1992) and Hurd
(1989)).25 The next two rows of Table 7 evaluate the effects of the bequest motive parameters.
We first consider the case in which there is no bequest motive (b = 0). The results show
that the bequest motive plays a role in our model. In its absence, the model generates too
low homeownership rates and too little wealth accumulation late in life (although the results
are not shown in the table, this is still the case if we increase the benefits from aging in
place further). The next row shows the effects of setting κ = 0. When bequests are not a
luxury good, individuals want to save more, particularly at lower levels of wealth. This means
that they tend to remain homeowners for longer. This experiment also shows that some of
the model parameters impact some of the target moments in the same direction, making it
challenging to precisely identify the values of the different parameters.26 However, in spite
of these considerations, when agents in our model do not derive utility benefits from aging
in place, homeownership rates late in life are always too low, even with stronger bequest and
precautionary savings motives.27
25More recently, Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2011) have used survey data to estimate
a structural model in which they separate bequest and precautionary savings motives. Their estimates
highlight the importance of public care aversion in explaining the data.
26For instance, benefits from aging in place lead individuals to remain homeowners until later in life,
as does a stronger bequest motive (or a lower κ). Furthermore, given that our data (and model) are for
homeowners at the beginning of retirement, it does not capture the behavior of the very poor, which would
be useful to evaluate the extent to which bequests are a luxury good.
27A higher expected house price growth has also limited success in generating high homeownership rates
late in life. Even though it increases the attractiveness of housing as a vehicle for saving, it also reduces its
rental cost. Furthermore, as retirees age and house prices increase, there are additional incentives to tap
into the higher home equity. The more realistic and comprehensive modeling of the risks that retirees face
explains why in our model it is difficult to generate high rates of homeownership late in life, compared to
models where fewer risks are modeled (for example Yang (2009)).
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Finally, we show the effects of a lower value for the elasticity of substitution between
housing and non-durable consumption. As Zevelev (2017) discusses, there is a large dispar-
ity in estimates in the literature ranging from values well below one to those well above one.
When we set ε = 0.8, agents in our model want to sell their house too early and to reduce
maintenance. Our calibrated value is at the top of the range considered by Piazzesi, Schnei-
der, and Tuzel (2007) but is significantly lower than the one estimated by Bajari, Chan,
Krueger, and Miller (2013).
5.3 Reverse mortgages
5.3.1 Drawdown loans
We now introduce drawdown RMs into the model. We start by solving it for the set of
calibrated preference parameters and for aggregate initial conditions that correspond to
those faced by retirees in the cohort born in 1930-1934, who reach age 65 at the beginning
of the HRS sample, including an initially high interest rate. The comparison of the initial
age value functions of homeowners with and without a RM, i.e. V H,RM1 (.) and V
H,NoRM
1 (.)
allows us to evaluate the benefits of the loans for retirees. More precisely, we calculate the
proportion of initial cash-on-hand that they are willing to pay to have access to RMs. We
focus on the welfare gains for retirees who are initially in good health (since this is the case
for the majority of age 65 individuals) and face low initial medical expenditures. But we will
also perform calculations for other parameters and initial conditions.
In each panel of Table 8, the first three rows report the results for retirees across the
income distribution (for two levels of initial cash-on-hand corresponding to percentiles 25
(Panel A) and 50 (Panel B) of the distribution of age 65 cash-on-hand in the HRS data). The
welfare gains are zero throughout. The high costs and the property maintenance requirement
eliminate the loan benefits. This result is consistent with the small number of loans originated
before the turn of the century, as shown in Figure 1.28
Even though in reality the demand for the loans was initially extremely small, it was not
exactly zero, so it is instructive to investigate, within the context of our model, the nature
of the parameter value changes required for the loans to become beneficial for retirees. In
the next two rows of Table 8, we show that this can be achieved through a reduction in the
importance of the bequest motive or in the value for the discount factor (while in each case
28In the model, the death shock is realized before individuals have the time to make any decisions. We
have solved the model under the alternative assumption that when retirees know that they are about to
die, they still have the time to drawdown any unused portion of the credit line (which is optimal in cases of
negative equity). The welfare gains of the loans are still zero.
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Table 8: Drawdown loans.
Welf gain PV CF Lenders PV CF IA
Parameterization of retirees Yield Risk-adj. Yield Risk-adj.
Panel A: Percentile 25 of initial cash-on-hand
Perm Inc Group 1, calibrated parameters 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Perm Inc Group 3, calibrated parameters 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Perm Inc Group 5, calibrated parameters 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lower discount factor (β = 0.90) 0.32 17.8 18.0 -10.4 -12.6
Weaker bequest motive (b = 6) 0.31 16.5 16.8 -10.3 -12.4
No aging in place ben. (α = 0) and b = 6 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Panel B: Percentile 50 of initial cash-on-hand
Perm Inc Group 1, calibrated parameters 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Perm Inc Group 3, calibrated parameters 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Perm Inc Group 5, calibrated parameters 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lower discount factor (β = 0.90) 0.05 16.8 17.0 -10.4 -12.5
Weaker bequest motive (b = 6) 0.08 15.8 16.0 -10.2 -12.2
No aging in place ben. (α = 0) and b = 6 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
keeping all other model parameters equal to the calibrated values). To avoid increasing the
length of the paper, we report results only for the middle permanent income group. Retirees
who derive utility from aging in place but who do not have such strong incentives to save as
retirees with the calibrated parameters, value the ability to borrow against the house, more
so at lower levels of initial cash-on-hand.29 For b = 6 the proportions of initial cash-on-hand
are 0.31 and 0.08 for individuals with percentile 25 and percentile 50 of the distribution of
initial cash-on-hand respectively.
The remaining columns of Table 8 report, for the cases for which the loans are beneficial
for retirees, the present value of the cash-flows received by lenders and by the insurance
agency using two different discount rates (bond yields and risk-adjusted). The present val-
ues are in thousand U.S. dollars per loan and calculated as an average across many different
realizations for the aggregate and individual specific shocks. In other words, they are ex-
pected present discounted values at loan origination. The values for the insurance agency
are negative. This means that the price of the insurance is too low, and that the government
is subsidizing these products, a point made by Davidoff (2015) and Lucas (2016), in the
context of different models, set in continuous time.
29The quantitative results for the other income groups (not reported) are obviously different, but the same
economic intuition holds.
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The cash-flows of the insurance agency are more negative when we use a risk-adjusted
discount rate that captures the fact that the agency must make large payouts in states of
the world with large house price declines, which are states with high marginal utility of
consumption and low risk-adjusted discount rates. In contrast, the cash-flows of the lenders
are positive and slightly higher when we use a risk-adjusted discount rate, even though
lenders are insured against default losses. This is because borrowers are more likely to draw
on the loan, which implies negative cash-flows for lenders, when house prices increase. These
are states of the world with low marginal utility of consumption. It is important to note that
these present values should not be interpreted as being equal to the profits of lenders, since
we have not subtracted the costs of originating and servicing the loans.
The last row of Table 8 reports the results for the case of a weaker bequest motive but
no aging in place benefits. The loans are no longer beneficial for retirees. They prefer to sell
the house early on and rent rather than to take out a loan.
Table 9 reports the age profiles of debt drawn and debt outstanding (in thousands of
dollars) for the weaker bequest motive parameterization (and for percentile 25 of initial
cash-on-hand). The bulk of the borrowing takes place between the ages of 70 and 84. Late
in life, the amounts drawn are smaller on average since some retirees have exhausted their
debt capacity. In the model, the most common motive for loan termination is death. While
alive, borrowers in a situation of negative home equity do not voluntarily exit the home
and terminate the debt contract. However, there is a small proportion of retirees, equal to
3.4 percent of the total, who (involuntarily) exit the home and default on the loan while
still alive, at a loss for the insurance agency.30 These are retirees who have exhausted their
debt capacity, are in a situation of negative equity, and are hit by the forced sale shock
(3.2 percent) or while not being hit by the shock they are not able to meet the property
tax and maintenance expenses and are forced to default (0.2 percent). Even though this is
a relatively small proportion, it could be very important for lenders who are worried about
the reputational risk of foreclosing on old retired homeowners.
The last row of Table 9 shows the values for different percentiles of the present value cash-
flow distribution of the insurance agency. The median cash-flows (in thousands of dollars)
are positive, but the agency faces significant downside risk.
30The loans induce moral hazard on moving out of the house while alive, since borrowing acts as a substitute
for an earlier house sale.
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Table 9: Amount drawn, debt outstanding and distribution of present value of
cash-flows for weaker bequest motive parameterization (b = 6).
Percentile 25 of initial cash-on-hand
Age group: 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94
Average annual amount drawn 0.5 2.1 3.3 2.6 1.6 1.0
Average debt outstanding 7.0 17.7 39.9 66.2 91.5 117.1
PV risk-adjusted CF, percentiles: p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
PV CF Lenders 4.2 5.3 7.7 12.5 22.3 33.8
PV CF to Insurance agency -56.4 -43.4 -22.8 1.4 2.0 2.8
5.3.2 Lump-sum reverse mortgages
In lump-sum RMs, retirees borrow the whole amount up-front, at an interest rate that is fixed
at loan initiation. We have solved our model for such a product, for the same borrowing limit
and loan costs as the drawdown loans. This provides a benchmark and facilitates comparison
across loans. The benefits for the calibrated parameters were always zero. And they were also
zero for the weaker bequest motive parametrization with b = 6. It was only when we reduced
the strength of the bequest motive further that the lump-sum loans became beneficial. For
example, for b = 2 and percentile 25 of the distribution of initial cash-on-hand, the welfare
gains are equal to 0.14. But even in this case the welfare benefits are lower than those of
drawdown mortgages. Thus, the model has difficulty in generating demand for lump-sum
mortgage products. To make them more appealing to retirees, we would need to model a
motive for retirees to wish to withdraw a large amount upfront, such as the presence of
pre-existing debt that is amortized using the proceeds from the lump-sum loan. We consider
this possibility later on in the paper.31
5.3.3 Historical changes in loan terms, interest rates and house prices
There have been historical changes in loan terms, interest rates and house prices. We evaluate
their effects on the benefits of drawdown RMs. To facilitate the comparison, we first use the
same initial conditions as in the previous section, for individuals in the middle permanent
31In reality supply factors may also play a role in the loan origination process. Since in lump-sum loans the
whole amount is borrowed up-front, the average debt outstanding and the cash-flows of lenders are higher
than those in drawdown loans. This may incentivize them to try to sell the former to retirees. The added
risk and potentially higher losses are borne by the insurance agency. Another supply factor that may affect
the incentives of lenders is that it may be easier to securitize lump-sum loans than drawdown loans (again
because the whole amount is borrowed up-front).
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income group (including house values), and change only the loan terms and initial interest
rates. Table 10 reports the two sets of changes that we evaluate, corresponding to the years
2006 and 2010.32
Table 10: Historical changes to loan parameters.
Description Parameter Year 2006 Year 2010
Initial borrowing limit l1 0.577 0.584
Annual mortgage ins. premium ψA 0.005 0.013
Lender’s margin ψL 0.015 0.023
Real interest rate R1t 0.031 −0.006
The results in Table 11 show that for both sets of parameters, and similar to the bench-
mark case, RMs are not beneficial for retirees. Therefore, in addition to the changes in loan
parameters, we consider the effects of changes in house values. The median ratios of housing
wealth to income for retirees aged 65 or 66 in the HRS data in 2006 and in 2010 are 6.8
and 7.4, respectively. In Table 11 we report the RM benefits for two different initial house
values (and sizes) relative to income (we keep income fixed to facilitate the comparison).
There are several interesting results. First, for some of the parameterizations, RMs be-
come beneficial. Second, the benefits are generally larger for 2006 than for 2010. For the
latter year they only become marginally positive at lower levels of initial cash-on-hand and
when we increase the initial house value to a multiple of eight of income. These time-series
patterns for the model predicted benefits of RMs roughly match the time-series patterns for
the number of new loans endorsed, plotted in Figure 1.
The model provides an explanation. For individuals who derive utility benefits from aging
in place, a higher house value relative to retirement income (and financial savings) makes
it more attractive to use RMs to tap into home equity. This point is also highlighted in
the empirical analysis of Shan (2011), who combines reverse mortgage data with county-
level house price data to show that elderly homeowners are more likely to purchase reverse
mortgages when the housing market is at its peak. The main reason why in the model, for
a given house value relative to income, the benefits of RMs are higher in 2006 than in 2010
is the higher interest rate in the former compared to the latter year. This may seem strange
since a higher interest rate usually means a higher loan cost, but for RMs a higher interest
rate also means that the borrowing limit will grow faster, so that retirees who do not borrow
32These values come from several mortgagee letters, historical data, and papers in the literature (most
notably Davidoff (2015)). We give further details in Appendix C.
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Table 11: Drawdown loans: historical changes.
Welf gain PV CF Lenders PV CF IA
Parameterization of retirees Yield Risk-adj. Yield Risk-adj.
Panel A: Percentile 25 of initial cash-on-hand
2006 loan param. 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
2006 loan param., house value = 7x inc 0.32 18.0 18.2 -11.8 -14.3
2010 loan param. 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
2010 loan param., house value = 7x inc 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
2010 loan param., house value = 8x inc 0.02 26.2 26.8 -12.6 -16.0
Higher house price risk (ση = 0.20) 0.31 14.2 14.3 -11.1 -13.5
Low mean house price ret. (µH = −0.02) 0.41 17.6 17.9 -21.9 -24.0
Panel B: Percentile 50 of initial cash-on-hand
2006 loan param. 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
2006 loan param., house value = 7x inc 0.15 17.2 17.3 -11.5 -14.0
2010 loan param. 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
2010 loan param., house value = 7x inc 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
2010 loan param., house value = 8x inc 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Higher house price risk (ση = 0.20) 0.10 13.5 13.7 -11.0 -13.4
Low mean house price ret. (µH = −0.02) 0.20 17.1 17.3 -21.7 -23.8
the full amount up front will be able to access more funds later in life (and possibly make
strategic use of the put component of the product).
These two features of RMs, namely the right to borrow against the house and the option to
default, are clearly explained by Davidoff (2015). In the last two rows of Table 11, we perform
two experiments to illustrate them, keeping all the other parameters at their benchmark
values. First, we increase the standard deviation of house price returns to 0.20. RMs become
beneficial: the higher the volatility of the underlying asset and the longer the horizon the
higher the value of the put option.33 This highlights the importance of modeling RMs as
long-term debt contracts. Second, we decrease the log expected house price growth to -0.02.
This also increases the value of the option to default on the loan.
Although the benefits of RMs predicted by the model mirror the time-series patterns of
new loans endorsed, it is important to acknowledge its limitations with respect to explaining
33The horizon may be longer due to a higher life expectancy. We have solved and parameterized the model
for a single individual. However, the HECM program does not distinguish between singles and couples. In
the case of a couple, the borrowing limit is determined using the age of the youngest co-borrower. We have
evaluated the effects of the higher life expectancy of couples on the RM benefits. In Appendix C we give
details on how we parameterize it. Even though the value of the put increases, the benefits of the loan for
the calibrated parameters are still zero.
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the total number of new loans endorsed, particularly for 2006. The model predicts that RMs
are beneficial for a number of individuals larger than the total number of endorsed loans in
this year.
5.4 Other assets and liabilities
Retirees have other assets and liabilities that so far we have not explicitly considered. In
appendix D we give details on their prevalence using HRS data. In this section we analyze
possible interactions between some of them and RMs. Throughout, we use the benchmark
parameters (and the initial conditions of the 1930-1934 cohort, middle permanent income
group).34
5.4.1 Insurance against forced house sale.
One of the risks that the retirees in our model face is that they may be forced to sell their
house. For individuals who derive utility benefits from aging in place, being forced to sell one’s
home and move can have a large adverse utility impact. We are interested in investigating the
benefits of purchasing insurance against such an event in our model.35 Given its complexity
and large number of state variables, we consider a simple form of insurance which pays the
retiree a certain dollar amount in the event of and in the period of the forced house sale
(and zero in all other periods). The retiree decides whether to purchase such insurance at
the initial model age of 65 for a one-off payment. We solve our model for both an actuarially
fair insurance and one with an 8% load.36
Table 12: Welfare gain of insurance against forced sale.
Actuarially fair price Load = 8%
Parameterization/Initial cash-on-hand Median Perc 25 Median Perc 25
Cash rec. when forced sale = 5,000 0.009 0.013 0.008 0.011
Cash rec. when forced sale = 10,000 0.015 0.019 0.014 0.016
Cash rec. when forced sale = 20,000 0.022 0.022 0.019 0.014
In Table 12 we report results for three levels of payout that retirees receive in the event
34In appendix B we expand on this analysis, and show that the model generates little annuity demand.
35Davidoff (2010) shows how home equity may substitute for long-term care insurance.
36The calculation of the insurance price requires that insurance companies can evaluate the (initial) health
status of the retiree. In addition, we assume that the probability of a forced house sale is unaffected by the
purchase of the insurance. We use interest rates to discount the payouts.
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of a forced house sale: five, ten and twenty thousand dollars. The purchase of the insurance
is beneficial for all the cases considered, but more so for retirees with higher initial cash-
on-hand. Retirees with lower initial cash-on-hand are more likely to benefit from the lower
bound in consumption, but less so when they have insurance against a forced house sale.
This reduces the benefits of purchasing insurance for these individuals. For median levels
of initial cash-on-hand, the benefits of the insurance vary between 0.8 and 1.9 percent of
this initial cash-on-hand (for an 8% load). We have investigated whether an individual with
median initial cash-on-hand who purchases insurance against a forced sale wants to take out
a RM with a maintenance requirement, but found this not to be the case.
5.4.2 Pre-existing mortgage debt
Although the median individual at age 65 does not have any mortgage debt outstanding, a
significant proportion of them do (we include details in Appendix D). This has motivated us
to investigate the benefits of RMs for retirees who have pre-existing outstanding mortgage
debt larger than their initial financial assets. We assume that 30,000 dollars is outstanding
at age 65, that the remaining mortgage maturity is 10-years, and that the premium on
this pre-existing debt is 2%. We use these assumptions to determine the annual mortgage
payments that the retiree has to make over the following ten years. We solve the model and
obtain the age 65 value function.
The alternative is to take out a RM and pre-pay the pre-existing mortgage debt. We
assume that there are no pre-payment fees. We solve the model for the lump-sum loan
and obtain the benefits of the RM by comparing the value function to that of the case
in which retirees do not take out the loan. Recall that in the benchmark case, without
pre-existing mortgage debt, RMs were not beneficial. For individuals with median levels
of initial cash-on-hand, the loans are still not beneficial. However, when the substantial
pre-existing debt is combined with lower levels of initial cash-on-hand (percentile 25 of the
distribution), individuals are willing to pay 0.20 of initial cash-on-hand to have access to the
loans. Therefore, in the presence of pre-existing debt, the demand for RM loans increases in
general, and for lump-sum loans in particular (since individuals must borrow a substantial
amount up front to pre-pay the existing debt). Nakajima and Telyukova (2017) also find
that pre-existing debt increases the demand for RM loans, but they restrict their attention
to short-term drawdown loans.
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6 Experiments
We analyze the impact of some of the terms and features of drawdown RMs on their benefits
to retirees, and on cash-flows to lenders and the government. We illustrate the effects using
the parameter values for the cohort born in 1930-34 and permanent income group three.
Recall that for the benchmark case, the products are not beneficial for retirees.
6.1 Maintenance requirement and government insurance
One of the requirements of RMs is that retirees maintain their house. If they fail to comply
with this requirement, the lender has the right to foreclose on the property. We now relax
the maintenance requirement and set annual housing maintenance equal to the minimum
level of 1% of the property value. RMs are now beneficial for retirees: the welfare gains
are equal to 0.26 of initial cash-on-hand (first row of Panel A.1 in Table 13). Retirees in
our model (as in the data) cut down on housing maintenance in old age. This allows them
to dissave and release cash for medical and other expenditures. The undesired maintenance
that RMs impose reduces the benefits of the products. It explains why the benefits of RMs
in our model are not as large as in Davidoff (2015).
The lower level of housing maintenance has a cost for the insurance agency. The collateral
value of the property is lower, and the potential loan losses larger. In an attempt to improve
the expected payoffs for the agency, we increase the annual insurance premium from the
benchmark value of 0.5% to 1.5%. Perhaps surprisingly, this has a relatively small effect on
the payoffs. The economic reason is simple, though. A higher premium benefits the agency in
periods prior to loan termination. However, it also means that the outstanding loan amount
will be higher at each point in time, not only because of the additional premium, but also
because in subsequent periods lenders receive the loan margin on the higher outstanding loan
balance. This makes it more likely that at loan termination outstanding loan balances will be
higher than house values. As premia are increased, there is a reduction in borrower benefits,
which is likely to reduce the overall demand for the products and the total expected losses
of the agency. For an annual premium equal to 0.02 (not shown on the table), the products
are no longer beneficial for retirees. In the third row of Panel A.1 we consider the effects
of a reduction in the initial borrowing limit to 0.50 of house value, while maintaining the
insurance premium at the baseline value. It leads to a decrease in the benefits for retirees,
which become zero.
For all of the parameterizations that we have considered, the expected present value of the
payoffs for the insurance agency are negative. They are also more negative than the benefits
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Table 13: Maintenance requirement and government insurance.
Maintenance equal to 1% of property value for all the cases considered.
Welf gain PV CF Lenders PV CF IA
Parameterization of retirees Yield Risk-adj. Yield Risk-adj.
Panel A.1: High initial interest rate, pctile 25 of initial cash-on-hand
Calibrated parameters 0.26 16.5 16.7 -15.3 -17.4
Annual insurance = 0.015 0.06 16.9 17.1 -13.4 -15.5
Borrowing limit = 0.50 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
No insurance, borrowing limit = 0.50 0.20 1.5 -0.2 n/a n/a
House val.=7x inc, no ins., limit = 0.45 0.36 3.4 1.6 n/a n/a
Panel A.2: High initial interest rate, pctile 50 of initial cash-on-hand
Calibrated parameters 0.03 16.0 16.3 -15.2 -17.3
House val.=7x inc, no ins., limit = 0.45 0.06 3.4 1.6 n/a n/a
Panel B.1: Low initial interest rate, pctile 25 of initial cash-on-hand
Calibrated parameters 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Annual service cost = 0 0.38 8.8 9.1 -9.3 -11.2
House val.=7x inc 0.25 18.7 19.0 -12.6 -15.1
House val.=7x inc, no ins., limit = 0.50 0.20 5.9 4.1 n/a n/a
Panel B.2: Low initial interest rate, pctile 50 of initial cash-on-hand
Calibrated parameters 0.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Annual service cost = 0 0.13 8.2 8.5 -9.1 -11.0
House val.=7x inc 0.04 18.0 18.3 -12.3 -14.7
House val.=7x inc, no ins., limit = 0.50 0.01 5.4 3.6 n/a n/a
to retirees. For instance, in the first row of Panel A.1 of Table 13 the risk-adjusted losses
for the insurance agency are 17.4 thousand dollars, making them larger than the benefits
to retirees of 2.5 thousand dollars (0.26 of 9.64 thousand dollars). The loan guarantees
expose the government to significant downside risk, and more so when the levels of property
maintenance are lower. In contrast, the payoffs for lenders are positive and large. They bear
no house price risk, but the high loan margins and product fees mean that the expected
present value of their cash-flows is large.
The large expected losses for the insurance agency raise the questions of whether the
products would be provided in the absence of government subsidies and, if so, how loans
provided solely by the private sector would differ from those currently available in the U.S..
As a first step, we note that in the U.K. there are RMs provided by private lenders without
government guarantees, with a no negative home equity guarantee (so that lenders bear the
losses in the event of house price declines). In Appendix A we compare the products in more
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detail, but one of the differences is that borrowing limits are lower in the U.K. than in the
U.S..
With this in mind, we examine the removal of mortgage insurance and all of the associated
costs (initial and annual). In this scenario, there is no insurance agency and lenders bear the
downside risk. The first no insurance row in Panel A.1 reports results for an initial borrowing
limit of 0.50 (lower than the 0.564 in the benchmark). Even though lenders break even if one
uses the risk-free rate to discount their cash-flows, they do not break even on a risk-adjusted
basis. When we reduce the initial loan limit further to 0.45, the loans are no longer beneficial
for retirees (not shown on the table). The last row of Panel A.1 of Table 13 shows that the
loan benefits to retirees and lenders are higher for the case of higher house value relative to
income.
Panel A.2 shows the results (for a subset of the cases in Panel A.1) for higher initial
cash-on-hand. The benefits of RMs to retirees are smaller. In Panels B.1 and B.2 we report
results for an initially low interest rate, so that the borrowing limit will grow more slowly
(if the agent does not borrow the full amount up-front). The relaxation of the maintenance
requirement is not sufficient to make the loan attractive for agents. For that to happen,
a reduction in the annual service costs is needed.37 Alternatively, loans are also beneficial
when initial house values are high relative to income. As before, the insurance agency suffers
substantial losses. If we eliminate the government insurance and lenders bear the house
price risk, it is possible for lenders to have positive expected cash-flows and the loans to
be beneficial for retirees.38 A larger demand for RMs may allow lenders to benefit from
economies of scale.
6.2 Product design: insurance against forced sale.
One of the risks that retirees in our model face is that they may be forced to sell their
house, which has a particularly large adverse utility impact due to the loss of the benefits
from aging in place. It also interacts with the RM: the forced house sale triggers early
loan termination and a reduction in the ex-ante benefits of taking out a loan. This point is
made by Michelangeli (2010). Our contribution here is to quantitatively evaluate the benefits
of combining RMs with the insurance against a forced sale. We do so for our calibrated
parameters (with high initial interest rates), but with maintenance expenses equal to 1%
37Since RMs do not require borrowers to make payments before loan termination, the loans do not need
to be serviced regularly like traditional mortgages. Therefore one might expect lower servicing costs.
38As previously discussed, one should not interpret a present value of cash-flows of lenders equal to zero
as the level that allows them to break even, since in the calculations we have not subtracted the costs of
originating the loans.
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of house value, so that the loans are beneficial for retirees even in the absence of insurance
against a forced sale.
The results are shown in the first panel of Table 14. The first row shows the benefits
for retirees, as a proportion of their initial cash-on-hand, if lenders combine RMs with the
insurance against a forced sale. The different columns report results for different values of
the cash that retirees receive (five, ten and twenty thousand dollars) and for two different
levels of their initial cash-on-hand (coh). Importantly, these benefits are calculated so that
the present value of the risk-adjusted cash-flows of lenders and of the insurance agency are
the same as in the case of reverse mortgages only (i.e. without the insurance against a forced
sale). This is achieved through cash transfers at the initial date between retirees, lenders
and the insurance agency so that the latter two are as well off as in the base case.
The second row reports the welfare gains for retirees for the scenario in which they have
a RM but no insurance against forced sale. They correspond to the first row of Panels A.1
and A.2 of Table 13. Since there is no insurance, the benefits are the same across columns.
The third row reports the results for insurance against forced sale but no RM (from Table
12). The last row of the panel shows the difference between the values in the first row and
the sum of the values in the second and third rows. These are the additional gains from
product bundling.
Table 14: Product design: insurance against forced sale
Maintenance equal to 1% of property value for all the cases considered.
Cash received when forced sale: 5k 10k 20k 5k 10k 20k
Panel A: Calibrated parameters Hi. int. rate, p25 of coh Hi. int. rate, p50 of coh
1. Reverse mort. and insurance 0.290 0.296 0.321 0.048 0.063 0.082
2. Reverse mort., no insurance 0.259 0.259 0.259 0.031 0.031 0.031
3. No reverse mort., insurance 0.013 0.019 0.022 0.009 0.015 0.022
4. Additional gain from bundling 0.018 0.018 0.041 0.008 0.017 0.029
Panel B: Higher house val. (7x inc) Hi. int. rate, p50 of coh Low int. rate, p50 of coh
1. Reverse mort. and insurance 0.252 0.285 0.294 0.054 0.068 0.088
2. Reverse mort., no insurance 0.236 0.236 0.236 0.038 0.038 0.038
3. No reverse mort., insurance 0.007 0.030 0.016 0.007 0.011 0.015
4. Additional gain from bundling 0.009 0.019 0.042 0.009 0.019 0.035
Interestingly, and importantly, the table shows that there are significant positive addi-
tional gains from the bundling of RMs with the insurance against a forced house sale. For
individuals who derive benefits from aging in place, the state of the world in which they are
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forced to sell the house is particularly bad. It gives rise to a precautionary savings motive,
which reduces the benefits of RMs. The insurance against a forced sale transfers resources
to individuals in this state of the world, it reduces the need for precautionary savings, and it
increases the benefits of the loans. This explains the product complementarities. The bene-
fits from combining RMs with the insurance arise in spite of the fact that the it reduces the
expected value of government transfers in case of a forced sale, more so for individuals with
lower initial cash-on-hand. Panel B reports the results for a higher house value relative to
income. We report results for high/low initial interest rates and median initial cash-on-hand.
The benefits from product complementarities are larger.
7 Conclusion
We have solved a quantitative model of retirees’ consumption and homeownership decisions
that incorporates aging in place utility benefits and housing maintenance choice. The evi-
dence that we provide and the model calibration show that these features play an important
role in explaining the housing decisions of the elderly. In our model, the maintenance require-
ment of RMs together with the high product costs reduce (or eliminate) the loan benefits.
We have carried out several experiments. The elimination of the maintenance requirement
increases the benefits of the loans for retirees, but leads to a deterioration in the govern-
ment position. The removal of the government insurance (and its associated costs) would
also increase demand for the products, but the borrowing limits would have to be tightened
for lenders to break even. In a final experiment, we have shown that combining RMs with
insurance against a forced house sale is Pareto improving in the sense that retirees are better
off, while lenders and the insurance agency are as well off as in the case in which reverse
mortgages are not combined with the insurance.
The decision of whether to take out a RM in old age is likely to be influenced by factors
absent from our model, such as the attitudes of retirees towards debt, retirees’ ability to
understand the products, their perception of how trustworthy the sellers of the products are,
among others. Some of these, such as attitudes towards debt, may change in the future,
as more individuals reach retirement age with significant amounts of outstanding debt. In
addition, as our results have shown, higher house values relative to financial savings (and
to retirement income) will create an extra incentive for homeowners to tap into their home
equity to finance retirement consumption.
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